What’s the Story Behind “Chinese Soldiers” in the Korean People’s Army During Korean War?
朝鲜人民军中的“中国军人”是怎么回事?
By Liu Zhihe (刘志河)
【Editor’s Note: The article explores the historical role of "Chinese soldiers" within North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA). These soldiers were primarily ethnic Koreans from the Chinese Eighth Route Army and People’s Liberation Army who were transferred to North Korea before the Korean War. Many had extensive combat experience in China’s Civil War and guerrilla warfare, significantly boosting KPA’s strength during the early stages of the Korean War. Prominent figures like Wu Ting (Jin Wuting) and Fang Hushan became key KPA commanders. However, as the war progressed, heavy casualties among these experienced soldiers left the KPA reliant on less trained local recruits. After the war, political purges led by Kim Il-sung targeted officers with Chinese and Soviet ties. Many were executed, imprisoned, or marginalized, while their contributions were erased from official history. Of the 50,000 ethnic Korean soldiers who had returned from China, 30% died in combat, and 20% were later compelled to return to China.】
According to incomplete statistics, following the end of the Korean War, of the 50,000 ethnic Korean (朝鲜族) officers and soldiers who returned to North Korea (朝鲜), 30% died in combat, 20% were captured, another 30% eventually settled in North Korea after joining other North Korean units, and a further 20% gradually returned to China due to deep-seated feelings of marginalization between the war’s end and 1957. Many of these individuals were either injured or disabled.
As is well known, more than sixty years ago, during the Korean War (朝鲜战争)—here referring to the conflict from June 5, 1950, when it broke out, to July 27, 1953, when the armistice was signed, encompassing both the phase in which Korea (朝鲜) fought alone against South Korea (南朝鲜, then known as South Joseon) and United Nations forces, as well as the later stage when the Chinese People’s Volunteers (中国志愿军) entered the war to “Resist America and Aid Korea”—the Chinese People’s Volunteers and the Korean People’s Army (朝鲜人民军) fought jointly against the United Nations forces led by the United States and against the South Korean military (then called “South Joseon Army”). They achieved feats that drew worldwide attention. In terms of organizational structure, the two armies were clearly delineated: The Chinese People’s Volunteers, commanded by Peng Dehuai (彭德怀), were composed entirely of “volunteers” from China and did not fight under the Chinese national flag. The Korean People’s Army was the army of Korea under the command of Korean leader Kim Il-sung (金日成).
However, the Korean People’s Army and Chinese forces were not entirely separate. In fact, many of the soldiers in the Korean People’s Army were ethnic Koreans who had served in Chinese military units—they were ethnic Koreans who had served in the Eighth Route Army (八路军) and the People’s Liberation Army (解放军). For various reasons, this part of history gradually faded and became unknown to the public.
When the Korean War broke out, the United Nations Command accused China of allowing Koreans residing in China to return to their homeland. They claimed that before the outbreak of the Korean War, China had sent about 140,000 battle-hardened troops and personnel back to Korea, greatly enhancing the fighting strength of the Korean People’s Army and laying the groundwork for its combat operations. The Chinese government issued a statement pointing out that it was the “legitimate right and sacred duty” of the “Korean people residing in China” (居留中国境内的朝鲜人民) to return to Korea and that no country had the right to interfere or criticize this.
What was going on with these “Chinese” soldiers in the Korean People’s Army? The reasons are complex. Due to political and economic factors, Koreans had begun migrating to Northeast China from the late Qing (清) period onward. However, because neither the Qing government nor the Korean government recognized them, many of these Koreans did not obtain legal Chinese nationality, and they themselves still considered themselves Koreans. Only after the founding of the Republic of China (民国) were they recognized as Chinese nationals of Korean ethnicity. After Japan annexed Korea, large numbers of Koreans unwilling to live as conquered people fled to China to engage in anti-Japanese nation-restoration activities. This included figures like Kim Il-sung (金日成) and Syngman Rhee (李承晚), who would later become the first president of South Korea. After the “September 18 Incident” (九一八事变), not only did Japan accelerate the colonization of Northeast China, but it also pursued the sinister policy of “using Koreans to rule the Chinese” (以韩治华), driving large numbers of Koreans into the Northeast. Because the struggle for Korean independence never had a unified center, numerous factions emerged, sowing seeds for future party struggles and civil wars. Moreover, because China’s issue of Koreans’ dual nationality was never effectively resolved, many Koreans believed they were participating simultaneously in both the Chinese and Korean revolutions; they were both Chinese and, more importantly, Koreans.
After the liberation of the Korean Peninsula (朝鲜半岛) in 1945, the Korean People’s Army was primarily composed of two groups:
First, there were the Korean revolutionaries from the Soviet Far East’s 88th Brigade (苏联远东红旗军88旅), referred to by the Korean authorities as the armed forces of the Baekdu Mountain Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Unit (白头山抗日游击队). They had all been part of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (东北抗日民主联军) and were represented by figures such as Kim Il-sung (金日成, originally a battalion commander in the Soviet Army with the rank of major) and Choe Yong-gon (崔庸健, then Chief of Staff of the 88th Brigade), who assumed the vast majority of senior leadership roles in the Korean People’s Army. These individuals leaped from battalion- and company-level posts to regimental- and division-level, or even higher-level command, and although they had years of combat experience in the Anti-Japanese forces, they still lacked experience in commanding large-scale operations and thus had to rely on Soviet advisers behind the scenes.
The other group consisted of revolutionaries long active in the battlefields inside China proper, such as Wu Ting (武亭, also known as Jin Wuting, 金武亭), who had participated in the Guangzhou Uprising (广州起义), the first through fifth Counter-Campaigns against Encirclement and Suppression (一到五次反围剿斗争), the Long March (长征) of the Red Army, and had organized the Eighth Route Army’s first artillery regiment, serving as its regimental commander. Because he had also served as Commander-in-Chief of the Yan’an Korean Volunteer Army (延安朝鲜义勇军), he enjoyed high prestige within the Chinese Communist Party. However, due to obstruction by the Soviet Union and the subsequent North Korean regime, these individuals did not assume mainstream positions within the Korean People’s Army. It was not until after the Chinese Civil War (中国解放战争) victory that, at Kim Il-sung’s request, the Chinese Communist Party handed over the 156th, 164th, and 166th Divisions of the Fourth Field Army (第四野战军) and other Korean-composed units—complete with men and equipment—to Korea, changing their nationality, party affiliation, and military status. From July 1949 to August 1950, a total of 50,000 Koreans who had served in the People’s Liberation Army returned to Korea and joined the Korean People’s Army. This greatly strengthened the Korean People’s Army, ensuring that most of its senior commanders had experience fighting guerrilla warfare in the Northeast and, later, in China’s Civil War against the Nationalist forces (国民党军).
Among these units, the 164th Division was reorganized into the Korean People’s Army’s 5th Division (人民军第5师团, equivalent to a PLA division), commanded by Jin Changde (金昌德); the 166th Division became the People’s Army 6th Division (第6师团) under Fang Hushan (方虎山); and the 156th Division, merged with other ethnic Korean troops from the Fourth Field Army’s Independent 15th Division (独立第15师), became the People’s Army 12th Division (第12师团), commanded by Quan Yu (全宇).
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On June 25, 1950, when the Korean War broke out, several generals on the front lines of the Korean People’s Army had previously served in the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army (新四军), or the People’s Liberation Army:
First Army Corps (第1军团, West Front, main force) Commander: Jin Xiong (金雄), formerly an officer in the New Fourth Army
Second Army Corps (第2军团, East Front) Commander: Jin Guangxia (金光侠), who had experience both in the 88th Brigade and the Chinese Revolution (though after the war’s start, due to poor performance, he was replaced by Wu Ting)
Fifth Division (第5师团) Commander: Jin Changde (金昌德), formerly a PLA general
Sixth Division (第6师团) Commander: Fang Hushan (方虎山), formerly a PLA general
Seventh Division (第7师团) Commander: Cui Ren (崔仁), formerly a PLA general
Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, factional strife had already begun to surface within the Korean Workers’ Party (朝鲜劳动党) and the Korean People’s Army. Although the group centered around Kim Il-sung of the 88th Brigade faction was small, it occupied most of the senior and especially key positions within the Party and the Army. Meanwhile, the mid- and lower-level officers and soldiers were largely those who had returned from China. Wu Ting, with rich combat experience, high prestige, and senior qualifications far surpassing those of Kim Il-sung, who had only been a battalion commander, looked down on Kim’s background. As a result, Wu Ting’s position as the Party’s number-two figure steadily declined, and he was gradually marginalized. When the war broke out, however, the various factions set aside their differences and united against the enemy. Because the Koreans who came from the Chinese battlefields had far greater combat capability than the Korean guerrilla fighters and were also the main combat forces, the Korean People’s Army advanced with overwhelming momentum in the early stages of the war. Fang Hushan’s troops nearly captured the last area under South Korean control—Busan (釜山).
However, with the entry of U.N. forces into the conflict, the People’s Army suffered increasingly heavy casualties. Many of the officers and soldiers who had fought in China’s Liberation War were killed, and the People’s Army had to recruit new soldiers locally from the territories it occupied in South Korea. Because Kim Il-sung was obstinate and ignored China’s warnings that U.N. forces might land behind their lines, on September 15, the U.N. forces landed at Incheon (仁川), cutting off the People’s Army’s supply lines. The People’s Army collapsed across the board, and the frontline units were reduced to one-third of their original strength, with the remainder either killed or captured. Many of the People’s Army generals, especially those with Eighth Route Army and PLA backgrounds, were punished. When the U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel, the North Korean high command panicked and ordered Wu Ting to hold Pyongyang (平壤) at all costs. As a result, of the more than 30,000 defenders, hardly any managed to withdraw, and the entire force was virtually annihilated. Facing defeat, North Korea issued a general mobilization order, conscripting virtually all men aged 16 to 45 in its controlled territories. In this way, local North Korean personnel gradually filled the gaps left by the “Chinese” People’s Army units, creating a more homogeneous force loyal to Kim Il-sung.
After the Chinese People’s Volunteers entered the war, the Chinese force greatly outnumbered the Korean People’s Army. Due to poor communication and confusing command structures, incidents of Chinese and North Korean forces mistakenly firing on each other occurred frequently. China thus naturally proposed establishing a joint command headquarters and demanded authority over the People’s Army. Kim Il-sung deliberately avoided the issue until Stalin decided that the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ Commander-in-Chief would lead the combined Chinese-North Korean forces. Only then did Kim Il-sung reluctantly relinquish command, and even then, he retained some control. He handed over four army corps to the joint command, keeping three corps behind the lines under his own authority. Moreover, the four army corps under joint Chinese-North Korean command maintained their original structure and independence, and all personnel within those corps were Koreans.
When the fighting stabilized around the 38th parallel, the Chinese People’s Volunteers, the Korean People’s Army, the U.N. forces, and the South Korean forces began armistice negotiations. Ultimately, the talks focused on the repatriation of prisoners of war. According to the figures released by both sides, the U.S. side had captured 112,000 Korean POWs and 20,800 Chinese POWs, while the Chinese-North Korean side had captured 4,417 American and British POWs and 7,142 South Korean POWs. Since there was a huge disparity in the number of POWs held by each side, the U.S. insisted on voluntary repatriation, while China demanded that all POWs be returned. For North Korea, in reality, it had integrated a portion of the not-so-numerous South Korean POWs into its own army, and another portion was assigned to labor production in the North. Thus, the actual number of POWs under its control should have been greater than what was publicly reported. North Korea believed that most of its POWs consisted of “Chinese” People’s Army soldiers or those conscripted on the spot in South Korea, who did not hold much value. During the armistice negotiations, North Korea lost hundreds of men per day, a burden it could scarcely afford. These considerations led Kim Il-sung to advocate for accepting the U.S. principle of voluntary repatriation and reopening POW negotiations. On whether to insist on full repatriation or accept U.S. conditions, deep contradictions emerged between China and North Korea. After more than twenty months of intermittent fighting and negotiations, China compromised. The U.N. side finally agreed to return 70,000 POWs, but among them, only 6,400 were Chinese People’s Volunteers, and the remaining 14,000 were forcibly taken to Taiwan. Since the overwhelming majority of the returned POWs were actually North Koreans, plus the additional 42,000 South Korean soldiers captured by North Korea but not counted among the POWs, the numbers recouped by North Korea were not much less than what it had lost.
In August 1956, influenced by the Soviet Union’s 20th Party Congress, North Korean political figures with Chinese backgrounds who felt marginalized joined forces with those who had Soviet backgrounds, and together they opposed the faction represented by Kim Il-sung’s 88th Brigade guerrillas—authoritarian and intolerant of dissent. But Kim Il-sung skillfully played divide-and-conquer tactics, and the opposition alliance was defeated. Most of the dissenters were purged in what came to be known as the “August Faction Incident” (八月宗派事件). From then on, Kim Il-sung accelerated the establishment of his own authority and emphasized the importance of his “Juche” (主体) ideology, meaning independence in politics, self-reliance in the economy, and self-defense in national security. North Korea openly opposed foreign interference and reliance on other countries (“Sadaejuui” or “serving the great”). Naturally, the “Chinese” People’s Army, with its foreign associations, became a primary target of suppression.
Looking back at history, the primary leaders of the “Chinese” People’s Army had varied fates. Some died in the war, while others rose to prominence—such as Jin Changde (金昌德), who served as Director of the Cadres Bureau of the General Staff Department of the Korean People’s Army and as Chairman of the Disciplinary Committee of the General Political Bureau; and Quan Yu (全宇), who served as Commander of the People’s Army’s 5th Corps (第5军团长) and as Deputy Chief of the General Staff. And so on.
However, the fate of many more was lamentable: Wu Ting (武亭) was dismissed in December 1950 for “failing to carry out orders, poor battle command, and feudal warlordism” and died in misery in 1952. Jin Xiong (金雄), forced into the mountains to conduct guerrilla warfare after the U.S. landing at Incheon on September 7, was later labeled a counterrevolutionary factionalist and punished. After returning to North Korea in 1956, he was assassinated. Famous war generals like Fang Hushan (方虎山) and Li Quanwu (李权武) were denounced as anti-North Korean elements and disappeared without a trace. A large number of mid- and lower-level officers were politically purged after the war; some were tortured to death, some fled to South Korea or the Soviet Union, and some drifted back to China. Figures such as Pu Yiyu (朴一禹), who had been active in Yan’an (延安), a sacred place of Chinese resistance, for many years, were charged with “anti-Party factional activities” in 1955, removed from office, and ultimately executed.
After the Korean War ended, according to incomplete statistics, of the 50,000 ethnic Korean officers and soldiers who returned to Korea, 30% died in action, 20% were captured, 30% settled in other Korean units and made their home in North Korea, and another 20%, feeling deeply marginalized, gradually returned to China from the end of the war up until 1957. Many were injured or disabled.
Because of the special identity of these “Chinese” People’s Army soldiers, the unfavorable outcome they faced, the Yanbian (延边) factor, dual nationality issues, and Kim Il-sung’s inept command following the Incheon landing, North Korean domestic propaganda deliberately downplayed or even ignored their achievements, instead highlighting Kim Il-sung’s role and contributions. When mentioned at all, they were portrayed as Korean revolutionaries who, like Kim Il-sung, had taken refuge in China. More often, their deeds went entirely unacknowledged. As a result, the story of these “Chinese” People’s Army soldiers faded into obscurity, gradually forgotten by the world, especially by the North Korean people.
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This translation is an independent yet well-intentioned effort by the China Thought Express editorial team to bridge ideas between the Chinese and English-speaking worlds. The original text is available here: Dunjiao Net (钝角网) or Ao Tu Kengqiang (凹凸铿锵)
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December 13, 2024